Developmental Stages and Conflict within the Leninist Regime World

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There is a Leninist regime world, a group of regimes ruled by Leninist parties and primarily, if not exclusively, oriented to the Soviet Union. Currently this grouping is best referred to as a Soviet Union. Currently this grouping is best referred to as a Soviet-centered Leninist regime world (as opposed to either bloc or empire) in so far as the Soviet regime continues to be viewed as, and act as, the ideological source, military protector, and economic storehouse for other members of this "world".

As a regime world it has both essential features that have provided it with a continuously recognizable identity over time in international affairs (Modelski, 1960) and a developmental history marked at nodal points by substantial revisions in its ideological definition, political organization, and ethos. Recently in the article "Moscow Centre" (Jowitt, 1987:296-349), I introduced a set of concepts to characterize and analyze this regime world’s essential and developmental features. The present analysis builds on and assumes familiarity with that article.

If there is a Soviet-centered Leninist regime world, the reasonable place to begin a study of conflict related to developmental change is with the Soviet Union. And indeed the Gorbachev leadership’s initiatives do have the potential to dramatically change relations within the Leninist regime world, and with the non-Leninist world.

According to Gorbachev, the Soviet Union is in a pre-crisis situation domestically. This is the immediate stimulus for the "Brest-Litovsk" like atmosphere of urgency, even emergency, behind Gorbachev’s foreign policy initiatives, all of which are designed to create a set of placid international and regional

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(1) One can, of course, look at very different bases of conflict than those of a developmental order, e.g., economic and territorial. My sense is that they are important and obvious; developmental bases of conflict are, if anything, more important and not obvious.
environments that divert neither resources nor attention from internal problems. The range and order of Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives are impressive: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Soviet efforts to bring about the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Angola, an unprecedented arms reduction agreement with the United States, positive diplomatic gestures towards Israel, attempts to end the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, conciliatory statements to and about the Chinese highlighted by Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok, and a very judicious "light-handed" approach to what is potentially the most volatile region in the Leninist regime world and international politics—Eastern Europe. There the Soviets have held their political breath and squeezed their ideological nose and given the despised and embarrassing Romanian regime economic aid. And they have exercised patience in dealing with a Bulgarian regime that seems to have lost most of its political bearings. Wherever one looks in the world, the current Soviet leadership has responded to its domestic distress with a policy of accommodation.

However, one should be aware that more than one interpretation can, and should, be given to this policy. The two that I will distinguish and relate might be termed the "Hindu" and the "Hebrew". The "Hindu" perspective emphasizes the cyclical quality of Soviet foreign policy, the oscillation between periods of assertiveness and accommodation; and explains this cyclical oscillation in terms of situational distress. From this perspective a period of economic stagnation acts as a stimulus for an accommodation response in foreign policy, while a period of economic growth favors Soviet "assertiveness". What I will call the "Hebrew" interpretation complements the "Hindu" perspective in a crucial manner. The "Hebrew" interpretation of Soviet foreign policy suggests a more linear and less cyclical pattern of change; a pattern with a developmental as well as a situational basis. To take a case in point, one can compare the Litvinov and Shevardnadze foreign policies. Viewed from the "Hindu" perspective they amount to the same thing. The stimulus of domestic distress (military or economic threats) produces an accommodating Soviet foreign policy response. Hitler and SDI each produce Soviet accommodation. The flaw with


(3) While I am using the terms in a metaphorical sense, Mircea Eliade in his chapter "Misfortune and History" in *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 93-139 delineates the difference in Hindu and Hebrew cosmology from which I reconstruct these two perspectives.
this reasoning is its Pavlovian one-dimensional quality. It misses something, and that something is meaning. Similar behaviors can have very different meanings and consequences, because stressful situations may be mediated by very different institutional settings. In the two cases at hand, the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze response to domestic distress will differ substantially from the Stalin-Litvinov(4) response in good measure because of the radical changes in internal regime circumstances brought about by Khrushchev. The current Soviet leadership is not only responding to internal problems and external challenges; it is doing so in the context of major post-Stalin revisions in the Soviet regime’s ideological definitions and political organization. By politically and ideologically recognizing an “intermediate” international reality, the “third” world (more accurately ex-colonial) world, by allowing Leninist regime autonomy in place of absolute subordination within the “socialist community” of nations, by accepting the shared fate facing superpowers in any nuclear war, and by arguing that the Soviet population could no longer be viewed as a hostile contaminating socio-cultural force, Khrushchev substantially recast the ideological and political fields which mediate Soviet foreign policy. (5)

Stalin and Gorbachev’s foreign policies, like any regime’s foreign policy, can be seen as more or less assertive or accommodating. However, what may be missed in such an appraisal is that these two Soviet foreign policies are rooted in radically different developmental variants of Leninism, radically different Leninist institutional gestalts. To be sure one cannot explain the incidence or order of conflict within the Leninist regime world, or between in and the rest of the world, solely in terms of developmental differences and changes in the ideology, organization, and ethos of Leninist regimes; however, one will be left with a superficial explanation of those conflicts without it.

Leninist regimes typically address three (sequentially ordered) developmental tasks: Transformation, Consolidation, and Inclusion. Each task has an identifiable and different imperative associated with it, which leads to distinct and different regime profiles. Leninist Transformation regimes are typically decentralized in response to the imperative of coping with the turbulent environment associated with their effort to capture power. Leninist Transformation regimes

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(4) For a brief statement of Litvinov’s policy in the mid-thirties see George Kennan’s Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, New Jersey 1960), pp. 82-84.

have a war camp gestalt.

By way of direct contrast Leninist Consolidation regimes are typically very centralized in response to the imperative of minimizing access to the new regime by what the leadership sees as a socio-culturally unreconstructed and contaminating society. Leninist Consolidation regimes have a castle and moat<br>gestalt. Leninist Inclusion regimes are also centralized. But in response to the emergence of socially articulate audiences and incipient publics (what Western analysts regularly and misleadingly term “civil society”), and the continuing imperative to sustain the Party’s monopoly of political life, Leninist Inclusion regimes are less coercive and “steep”. Leninist Inclusion regimes have a court<br>gestalt.

One can say at least two things about the bearing these differences have on political relations within the Leninist regime world and its interaction with the non-Leninist world. First, that Leninist regimes with the same developmental profile can be in conflict with one another; and second, that those with different profiles can also conflict. Because these observations are “proverbial”, i.e., they may be true but they aren’t very helpful, we must be more specific about the causes and order of conflict between different and similar Leninist regimes. A start can be made by examining some illustrative cases.

Leninist parties facing the task of Transformation, i.e., attempting to capture power, have differed within and among themselves as to whether they should pursue a parliamentary or violent strategy. A contemporary example is provided by the disputes between the Italian and Portuguese parties in the 70’s. And as the relation of the Vietnamese Communist Party and the Khmer Rouge demonstrates, a Leninist party attempting to capture power through guerrilla-military means may see another party (or regime’s) actions as ill-timed and a threat to its success. Where one Party in this type of conflict is stronger in terms of armed force and/or status it may subordinate the aspirations of the other, at least in the short run, with predictable implications for an even more intense conflict between the two in the future. Again the Vietnamese-Khmer example is telling.\(^{(6)}\)

The conflict between two (or hypothetically more) Leninist Consolidation regimes may be even more intense, shrill, and hysterical. The Soviet-Yugoslav, and Albanian-Yugoslav conflicts in the late forties and early fifties

\(^{(6)}\) Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: Cambodia’s Revolution and the Voices of Its People* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1986). Provides an excellent analysis of the Khmer-Vietnamese CP relation from the time of the Comintern on. The book must also be considered one of the finest contributions to the study of a quasi-Leninist/Fanonian movement of rage, the Khmer rouge.
illustrate this quite well. Conflicts between Consolidation regimes reflect the anxiety laden dogmatizing of each regime as the correct incarnation of Leninism. Because there can only be one Papal regime the potential for conflict is high.\(^{(7)}\) However, in this instance, as in others, “Hindus and Hebrews” have to join hands, i.e., developmental and situational perspectives must be viewed in a complementary not mutually exclusive manner. The absence of military conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and Albania and Yugoslavia undoubtedly reflected the Soviet (situational) fear that an attack on Yugoslavia could involve the United States at a time when the Soviets had hardly recovered from the Second World War.

The relationship between Mao’s (Consolidation) China and Stalin’s (Consolidation) Soviet Union provides another insight into how situational and developmental factors enter jointly into relations of violence or the avoidance of such. The Mao-Stalin relation suggests that a militarily weaker Consolidation regime, like the Chinese, will defer to the status of the stronger, but only as long as the stronger, in this case the Soviets, is seen as upholding what the weaker asserts to be the correct ideological line. Still, even during their periods of cooperation, if my characterization of Consolidation regimes has merit, there exists a continual and powerful base for mutual and intense suspicion, resentment, and hostility.

Before considering real or potential conflicts between Leninist Inclusion regimes I want to examine the conflictual nexus between Consolidation and Inclusion regimes, in part to preface the analysis of conflict between Inclusive regimes.

The Sino-Soviet conflict (lasting some two decades) is the most dramatic instance of conflict between Leninist regimes at the Consolidation (China) and Inclusion stage of development. While the international scope and concern connected with this conflict certainly reflected the fact that the two major Leninist powers were involved, its intensity reflected the fact that the Sino-Soviet conflict was primarily a clash between two opposing beliefs about, and institutional definitions of, the proper and imperative political identity for a Leninist regime.\(^{(8)}\) The immediacy and primacy of identity issues related to,

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\(^{(7)}\) In his collection *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), Richard Lowenthal places great emphasis on the “Caesar-papist” quality of competing Leninist powers like China and the Soviet Union. Like him I see its expression as developmentally configured. (I would also suggest that a more appropriate subtitle for Lowenthal’s stimulating piece would be “the secularization of a disintegrating faith”).

\(^{(8)}\) I analyze and argue this point at great length in “Moscow Centre”, see pp. 315-327.
distinct from, and more important than conflicts over economic and geos-
strategic military interests best explain the hysterical quality of the Chinese
opposition to Khrushchevism (i.e., Inclusion). It is "no mere accident" that
with Deng Hsiao-ping's victory over Hua Guo-geng the tenor, presentation,
and intensity of Chinese opposition to the Soviet Union changed dramatically.

To be sure, it is an empirical question, not one of definition, whether or not
a change in a regime's policy has in fact a developmental as well as a
situationally expedient dimension. In the case of China in the late 70's early
80's it seems clear that changes in regime action were predicated on a radical
developmental change in regime definition. This is not to say that China's
situational distress was not genuine. The Chinese economy had reached a point
where economic difficulties were manifesting themselves as social and political
problems. China was not faring well in its "pedagogic" attempts to "teach
Vietnam a lesson". And with its invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union
served vivid notice that it disagreed with Brzezinski's observation that the
Chinese invasion of Vietnam "revealed some limits to Soviet power by demonstrat-
ing that an ally of the Soviet Union (Vietnam) could be molested with
relative impunity... The Soviet reaction throughout was confined to threats and
had as one motive a "lesson" for China.

Still, one cannot adequately explain the character of change in China begin-
ing in late 1979 and 1980 as a situationally expedient shift in some primordial
assertiveness-accommodation cycle. That not only fails to explain the very dif-
ferent Chinese responses to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (Within a year
of Which Chinese troops were fighting Soviet troops) and Afghanistan (within a
few months of which the Chinese had invited a major Soviet figure for a visit
and were getting ready to redesignate the Soviet Union a "socialist"
country); it fails to grasp the full meaning of the economic reforms and
planned political reforms in China. It is not the adoption of particular practices,
market or otherwise, that distinguishes the Chinese response; it is the radical
recasting of its Leninist features in the form of a new institutional gestalt,
fundamentally similar, not identical, to those initiated in the Soviet Union at

(9) On the different Chinese responses to the Soviet invasion see Richard D. Thornton.
pp. 331-338, and 431.

(10) Christopher Wren has recently compared Soviet and Chinese reforms in "Breaking
Out." The New York Times Magazine, August 14, 1988. He tends to emphasize the
differences without, however, ignoring the two regimes' common set of concerns.
the XXth Party Congress in 1956 — a shift from Consolidation to Inclusion.\(^{(11)}\)

With the radically Inclusive developmental change in China, and the Soviet attempt, beginning in 1985, to move from a neotraditional to a semi-modern variant of Inclusion a remarkable circumstance was created: for the first time in some thirty years the two major Leninist powers were in developmental sync. The point should be emphasized. Not only are China and the Soviet Union now organized around the same task of Inclusion with all the accompanying similarities in ideological, political, and policy similarities; they are also pursuing the same variant of a shared developmental task.

All too briefly, I conceive each developmental stage as having three possible variants: charismatic, traditional, and modern. The paradigmatic instance again is the Soviet Union. There Khrushchev’s plebiscitarian mode of Inclusive role had distinct charismatic features that not surprisingly were described by his neo-traditional successor Brezhnev as “harebrained”.

The neotraditional variant of Inclusion became dominant in the Leninist regime world during the seventies and part of the eighties.\(^{(12)}\) I say dominant not exclusive because Consolidation regimes existed in North Korea, Albania, and perhaps Cuba. For a while Vietnam simultaneously pursued the tasks of Transformation (in the South) and Consolidation, and the Hungarian and (most consistently) the Chinese regimes explored the outlines of a semi-modern variant of Inclusion. But in the Brezhnev, Gierek, Husák, Zhivkov, and Ceausescu regimes the neotraditional variant of Inclusion was firmly in place.

I characterize Gorbachev’s and Deng’s attempted reforms as semi-modern because they emphasize the role of the individual party member in opposition the corporate stratum of apparatchik, the role of impersonal procedure within the Party and in its relation to society in opposition to the personal (“big-man”) hierarchical role of the party boss, and the empirical investigation of issues (and consequently the value of information, expertise, and knowledge) in


opposition to uncritical ritualized modes of investigating and resolving issues.\(^{(13)}\)

Question: What bearing does the coincidence of developmental stage variant in the two major Leninist powers have on the potential for, and character of, conflict within the Leninist regime world, and between it, the West, and ex-colonial “third” world? (Short) answer: It reduces the potential for conflict and favors containment more than spillover where conflict does occur. The argument behind this contention is that semi-modern Inclusion regimes with their non-Manichean view of national and international environments, significant social reconciliation efforts (e.g., allowing for more private economic initiative, openly criticizing cadres, permitting more travel, and placing more emphasis on merit less on class), and more differentiated roles in international politics (compare Hungary not only with North Korea but with Czechoslovakia) tend to adopt a more sober issue-oriented, and a less hysterical identity-oriented political position.

The point can be developed best by comparing Gorbachev’s foreign policy with those of Khrushchev and Stalin. Stalin’s foreign policy was sectarian with a frequently hysterical emphasis on the isolation of the Soviet bloc from “imperialist” contamination (Cuba, Albania, and North Korea provide current though varying instances of this posture.) The paradigmatic expression of Stalin’s foreign policy was the Korean War: a clear demarcation of two mutually exclusive camps isolated from one another by a limited but real measure of violence.

Khrushchev pursued a missionary foreign policy with an emphasis on political conversion, particularly of the “third” world. One has only to note his wooing of Nkrumah in Ghana, Touré in Guinea, Keita in Mali, Nasser in Egypt, and Sukarno in Indonesia. But the paradigmatic expression of Khrushchev’s foreign policy was Cuba’s “conversion”.\(^{(14)}\) As for Brezhnev, he significantly revised the style of Soviet involvement in international affairs, adopting what was at one and the same time a more military and less militant approach in the “third

\(^{(13)}\) The prefix “semi” emphasizes the indecisive standing of the modern features of this orientation in relation to the persistent charismatic claims made by Leninists of the politically “nonbiodegradable” status of the party and its “correctness”.

\(^{(14)}\) I am aware of the highly ambivalent attitude the Soviets adopted towards political developments in Cuba. I am more impressed by the Soviet decision to resolve this ambivalence in favor of support for and certification of Cuba as a Leninist regime. The best analysis of Soviet-Cuban relations continues to be Jacques Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical Perspectives, 1959-1977 (New York: Praeger, 1978).
world”. Ethiopia and Angola are examples.

Gorbachev is neither a Leninist sectarian interested in isolating the Soviet regime from a hostile, contaminating world; nor is he a Soviet missionary who rationalizes Soviet intervention with the non-Leninist world by seeking its militant conversion. Gorbachev is a Leninist ecumenical.

Ideologically this expresses itself as an emphasis on universal over class interests. Politically, Gorbachev and his allies consistently emphasize the importance of the global economy, the international danger of AIDS, the value of joint space exploration, the need to upgrade the United Nations as a “universal” not bloc institution, and the urgency of universal international disarmament. Gorbachev’s attempts to recast Soviet relations with other members of the Leninist regime world and the non-Leninist world no more signify his denial of the ultimate “correctness” and superiority of Leninism in general and of Soviet Leninism in particular than Vatican II’s statement on ecumenism denies the ultimate truth and superiority of Roman Catholicism. Gorbachev’s “new thinking” can be understood as a Leninist form of ecumenism, as an attempt to extend the Khrushchevian notion of “state of the whole people” to “world of the whole people”. That notwithstanding (or forgotten) one must appreciate the remarkable implications of Gorbachev’s ecumenical approach to Soviet foreign policy, implications for relations within the Leninist regime world and for international relations in general.

Gorbachev never fails to emphasize that today, more than ever, Soviet foreign policy follows directly from domestic policy. If we understand the thrust of the latter, we will be better positioned to see that his foreign policy is not simply a Soviet “accommodation” to gain time for domestic reform. It is that and more.

The distinctive feature of Gorbachev’s domestic political agenda is his effort to make the CPSU more inclusive towards its general membership by breaking the identity between the apparatchiki’s monopoly of power and the party’s monopoly of power; and towards non-party persons and groups by recognizing them as integral trustworthy members of the Soviet polity. Khrushchev took the first step by attacking the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in its Stalinist secret police form, and in international affairs by attacking the “two


(16) A striking example of this latter point can be found in Gorbachev’s recent statement that Soviet churchgoers must be considered integral members of the Soviet polity.
camp” thesis and (inclusively) recognizing the “third world”. Gorbachev wants to challenge the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in its more fundamental apparatchik form, and internationally transcend the bloc organization of Europe. Gorbachev wants to “include” the Soviet Union in Europe.

He would like to see a reinvigorated Soviet polity, economy, culture, and society, at the center of a more viable and stable set of Leninist regimes. In a more profound sense than his predecessors Gorbachev realizes that the Soviet Union’s stature as the authoritative and symbolic focal point for the countries of “real socialism” (i.e., where Leninist parties are in power), for Western communist parties, and for revolutionary movements in the ex-colonial world is currently problematic.

Gorbachev sees a politically constipated, economically stagnant, and socially resented Soviet regime very possibly presiding over the fragmentation of international Leninism into social democracy in the West, the best example being the Italian Communist Party; *Far-leftist movements of rage* in the “third world”, the Khalq in Afghanistan, the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea, and Sendero Luminoso in Peru being outstanding examples; and what might be termed “mummy” rather than “real” socialism in most East European regimes. The Soviets don’t look with equanimity at the rise of movements in the “third world” calling themselves Leninist and behaving in a fascist-nihilistic manner; at the fact that their global power translates as success in countries that haven’t reached feudalism like Afghanistan and Angola; and at what must be the very resented and disquieting charge from *Western* European communist parties that “the phase... that began with the October Revolution, has exhausted its driving force...”

The Gorbachev leadership has more than enough incentive to “restructure” the Soviet Union’s foreign policies and the thrust of this restructuring will most likely be directed at Europe (West and East). Hough points out that “by the spring of 1986, Gorbachev was talking about his desire to end the schism of Europe” without the Soviet Union imposing its ‘faith’ on Western Europe.” (Hough, 1988:231-232) However, as Hough himself notes, the Soviet’s “set of diverse interests implies a complex policy” towards Western Europe. (Hough, 1988:237) Economic interests are obvious, military ones mixed (as Hough ably demonstrates), and cultural ones ignored but crucial in Gorbachev’s eyes.

It was Trotsky who long ago emphatically argued the need to “include” Russia economically and culturally in Europe. He observed in a prophetic manner that “The conditions for the arising of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the conditions for the creation of a socialist society are not identical, not of like nature, in certain respects antagonistic... Economic construction in an isolated workers’ state, however important in itself will remain abridged, limited, contradictory: it cannot reach the heights of a new harmonious society... The world wide division of labor stands over the dictatorship of the proletariat in a separate country, and imperatively dictates its further road... Russia is not a Ghettos of barbarism, nor yet an Arcadia of socialism. It is the most transitional country in our transitional epoch.”(18) For all the attention currently paid Bukharin in the Soviet Union, it is Trotsky’s argument that Gorbachev is “listening” to, to the political and visceral consternation of those for whom “socialism in one country” remains the bedrock of their Soviet ideological self.

The recent report of Yegor Ligachev’s public disagreement with Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze on a “key point of Communist ideology” refers to Ligachev’s contention that Soviet foreign policy must be primarily guided by the model of class struggle. Shevardnadze had previously told a conference of foreign policy specialists that universal interests now take precedence over class interests. “The struggle between two opposing systems is no longer a determining tendency of the present era.”(Keller, 1988)

As recently as November 1987 Ligachev’s position was presented by Gorbachev in his October Revolution (70th) anniversary speech as the leadership position. In that speech Trotsky was excoriated and prominent among the indictments was his failure to believe in the possibility and desirability of socialism in one country. (19) With or without specific reference to Trotsky, the current conflict within the Soviet elite over the place of universal and class interests is a conflict over the terms of the Soviet Union’s “inclusion” into Europe. Gorbachev and those who support him grasp the fact that without a more inclusion relation with the West with all its risks for the Soviet and East European regimes, the Soviet Union assumes the even greater risk of becoming a culturally, politically, and economically marginal international force, an Ottoman Empire with nuclear weapons.

The outcome of this conflict over the posture the Soviet Union will assume


in international relations will, as Gorbachev says, be decided by the debate and conflict within the Soviet leadership over what direction domestic developments should take: semi-modern civic or neotraditional ethnic.

With the exception of Vietnam, North Korea, Albania, and in certain respects Cuba (with its obsessive fear of “Yanqui” contamination matched only by America’s reciprocal punitive obsession) all Leninist regimes are Inclusive in their configuration. It is in the framework of this particular Leninist developmental configuration that the issue of semi-modern civic/neo-traditional ethnic emphasis is being articulated, debated, and fought.

Should Gorbachev succeed and recast the ideological weight of universal and class interests in favor of the former; subordinate the “missionary conversion” emphasis in post-Stalin foreign policy in favor of a ecumenical emphasis on the parallel and shared interests of the Soviet Union and the United States; partially dismantle the bloc-organization of Western and Eastern Europe; and partially restructure his own party’s membership ranking, then we will have a semi-modern civic and ecumenic mode of Leninist national and international development. Success of a civic-like political development within the Soviet party and a majority of other Leninist Inclusive regimes coupled with an ecumenical Soviet foreign policy would be a salutary development in every sphere of international relations. Civic-ecumenic developments in the Soviet Union would favor a Leninist regime world populated more by Soviet allies and less by Soviet subjects, by more individuated Leninist regimes like China and Yugoslavia having institutional affinities with the Soviet Union but less reliant not only resource wise but also identity wise on their connection with “Moscow ‘Centre’”, by regimes more capable of playing a varied rather than stereotyped set of international roles.

However, the odds are against a decisive outcome of this order in the Soviet Union or in the Leninist regime world. The odds favor a more neotraditional ethnic set of developments in both settings, a more “Romanian” less “Hungarian” development. I don’t mean we are likely to see an ersatz Stalinist leader with Pharoh like pretensions, and an inability to distinguish between “social-

ism in one country" and "socialism in one family" become General Secretary of the Soviet Union! I do mean that a Soviet Inclusive regime with a nativist ethnic ethos and orientation and a low threshold for internal and external ethnic conflict is a genuine possibility. And given the transformation in a large part of the Leninist regime world — including the Soviet Union — of mute peasant masses into articulate social audiences with no foreordained political orientation, the possibility of a more nativist Russian party (Bulgarian, Serbian...) actively and successfully mobilizing mass party and popular support is a very dangerous prospect for relations within the Leninist regime world where potential conflicts along this dimension abound, and between parts of that world (e.g., East Germany) and the non-Leninist world.

The central feature of current internal development in the Soviet Union, in the majority of Leninist regimes, and in the Leninist regime world is the consequential clash between semimodern civic and neotraditional ethnic definitions of Inclusion. In no regime will the outcome be absolutely in favor of one or the other orientation. In some regimes there may be a stalemate between the forces representing each, a stalemate that may be more or less stable. And in some one or the other will predominate. The overall regime world pattern will necessarily reflect the outcome in the Soviet Union.

I will conclude by presenting in ideal-typical terms one outcome of the current clash between the two orientations I have identified. The following is a theoretically premised caricature of empirical developments, one that has as its purpose the vivid delineation of what I consider the defining conflict in the Leninist regime world (and Leninist regimes) today to be used as a theoretical benchmark against which "real" developments can be compared and interpreted.

To wit: in the course of the next decade we will see two Leninist-like regime worlds with discernable boundaries emerge. One will be comprised of semi-modern civic oriented Leninist Russia, Northeastern European regimes, "Northern" Yugoslavia, China, and the Italian communist party. The other will be made up of the more ethnic oriented Central Asian "Leninist" regimes, Southeastern Europe, the North Korean, Cuban, and Vietnamese regimes all aligned more or less closely to a growing number of Fanonist movements of rage in the "third world".

In a striking and possibly portentous manner the current “division” of Yugoslavia into an aspiring semi-modern Leninist Slovenia, a neotraditional Serbia with, if anything, a growing ethnic emphasis, and a potential Albanian movement of rage in Kosovo may be a microcosm of the alternative and competing developments within the Soviet Union and the Leninist regime world today.
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